Chinese IPP Opposes One-Year Cap on Coal Deals, Citing Fuel Security Risks

Photorealistic view of a large coal-fired power plant with cooling towers and coal stockpiles at dusk

Pakistan’s biggest Chinese-backed coal power producer has pushed back against a government proposal to cap coal supply agreements at one year. In a detailed submission to the Central Power Purchasing Agency-Guarantee (CPPA-G), Port Qasim Electric Power Company (PQEPC) — which operates a 1,320-megawatt coal-fired complex of two 660 MW units at Port Qasim — warned that the restriction could undermine fuel security, disrupt procurement and increase operational risks for coal-fired power plants.

The proposal comes from the Power Division, which has been revising coal procurement guidelines for imported coal. PQEPC’s response, the most detailed industry objection so far, opens a wider debate over how Pakistan prices, procures and regulates fuel for its coal fleet.

Key Takeaways

  • Port Qasim Electric Power Company (PQEPC) has formally opposed a Power Division proposal to limit coal supply contracts to one year, warning it could threaten fuel security and create procurement gaps.
  • The Chinese-backed IPP also challenged a plan to benchmark coal prices against the highest discounts offered in rival tenders, calling such comparisons misleading.
  • The dispute plays out against tighter Indonesian coal supplies, overdue payments to Chinese plants, and a solar boom squeezing conventional power economics.

What the Power Division Is Proposing

According to PQEPC’s submission, the Power Division is considering changes to coal procurement rules that would restrict coal supply contracts to a single year. The company says it should instead be judged against its approved project documents — its tariff determination, generation licence, power purchase agreement (PPA) and implementation agreement with the government — under which it already procures imported coal.

PQEPC’s central argument is commercial rather than legalistic: international coal miners and shipowners, it says, generally prefer longer-term arrangements, particularly when buyers cannot offer minimum offtake commitments. Forcing annual retendering, the company warned, could leave procurement gaps — especially since each new tender must be completed before fresh board, shareholder and regulatory approvals can be obtained.

The one-year cap, in short

  • Proposed: coal supply contracts limited to 12 months.
  • Apparent aim: tighter oversight of procurement costs and discounts.
  • PQEPC’s warning: fuel-supply gaps, disrupted operations, weaker bargaining power with miners.

Why the Company Says the Cap Won’t Work

PQEPC’s objections go beyond the contract-length issue. In the same filing, it challenged a proposed mechanism that would benchmark the ceiling price of replacement or alternative coal supplies against the highest discounts offered in comparable tenders.

The Power Division has cited a spread of discounts — from $0.20 to $7.12 per metric tonne — as the basis for concern. PQEPC rejected that comparison outright. It said tenders cannot be judged on headline discounts alone because they differ in quantities, contract duration, payment currency, delivery terms, coal quality specifications and performance guarantees.

Crucially, the company pointed out that the $7.12-per-tonne discount came from a contract that was never implemented — and was backed by a performance guarantee of only about Rs5 million, which PQEPC described as commercially inadequate relative to the exposure involved. Comparing its own deals, which carry stronger supplier guarantees, against an unexecuted outlier was, in its view, unfair.

The company also disputed the treatment of past discounts against the ICI-3 Indonesian coal benchmark as a permanent entitlement. Market conditions have changed, it argued, and so have quality requirements: the minimum net as-received calorific value requirement has risen from 4,000 to 4,200, which inevitably shifts prices.

A Tighter Indonesian Coal Market

PQEPC’s commercial defence is bolstered by real supply-side pressure from Indonesia, Pakistan’s main source of imported thermal coal. The company cited a 23.34 per cent year-on-year decline in Indonesian seaborne coal exports in August 2026, following reductions in Jakarta’s export quotas during the year.

The company also defended buying replacement coal at less favourable prices when its regular suppliers default, calling such backup arrangements necessary to keep fuel flowing and to limit exposure to contractual penalties. On the question of supplier defaults, it supported accountability but demanded due process: an established breach, an opportunity to be heard, and exemptions for force majeure and circumstances beyond anyone’s control.

NEPRA Already Watches Fuel Costs, It Says

A recurring theme in PQEPC’s submission is that existing oversight is sufficient: the tariff framework already gives NEPRA monthly scrutiny of fuel costs through the fuel price adjustment mechanism, making a rigid annual contract limit unnecessary, in its view.

The company also took a legal position: NEPRA’s coal procurement guidelines are policy guidance and cannot override contractual and regulatory obligations unless they are formally incorporated into tariff determinations, licence conditions or contract amendments under the law.

And it pushed back on any suggestion that it profits from fuel procurement. PQEPC said it assumes fuel supply risks under its contracts, earns no return on the fuel-cost component and recovers only actual, verifiable procurement costs through its tariff. It cited a pass-through loss of roughly $0.58 per tonne in its most recent fuel price adjustment, and losses of around Rs1.62 billion associated with spot coal procurement guidelines.

Notably, the company also pointed a finger at the buyer: it claimed CPPA-G’s alleged failure to fulfil its minimum annual energy payment obligation under the PPA has itself made it harder to secure firm commitments from coal suppliers.

The Broader Context: Debt, Solar and Strained Finances

This procurement dispute is unfolding against a much larger crisis in Pakistan’s power sector. Reporting on Bloomberg’s analysis of the country’s solar boom puts overdue payments to Chinese electricity plants at more than $1.5 billion by August 2026, with outstanding project debt linked to China-financed coal assets at $3.1 billion.

At the same time, a rooftop solar surge is hollowing out grid demand. NEPRA data cited in that reporting shows electricity consumption across distribution companies almost 12 per cent lower in the 12 months to July 2025 than three years earlier — squeezing the economics of conventional plants that carry large fixed costs and debt.

Energy Minister Awais Leghari has said Pakistan is seeking longer repayment periods for power-sector debt rather than a reduction in the amount owed — but Chinese officials have shown limited willingness to offer concessions that would impose losses on Chinese state companies and banks.

What Happens Next

The proposals remain part of an ongoing debate over coal procurement rules and fuel security. PQEPC has asked the government and CPPA-G to reconsider the one-year cap, assess its procurement against the applicable project documents, and build due-process safeguards into any supplier-default cost-allocation mechanism.

Interestingly, the company also referenced NEPRA’s June 22, 2026 recommendations on imported coal procurement and floated the idea of designating a public-sector agency to centrally procure and supply coal to power plants.

For Pakistani consumers, the stakes are ultimately about electricity bills and supply reliability. Annual retendering might sharpen competition. But if PQEPC is right — that it fragments procurement, deters long-term suppliers and risks fuel gaps — the cost of the experiment could end up on the national grid, and on the people who pay for it.